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THiE CoMMioN LAw OF MANKIND. By C. Wilfred Jenks. Published under
the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs. New York: Fred-
erick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958. Pp. xxvi, 456. $12.50.
OVER the last few decades, many features of the power and other value
processes which occur in the international arena have undergone profound
and far-ranging changes. The recent literature of international law indicates
an increasingly wide recognition of both the insistent challenge and unmatched
opportunity presented by these changes to academicians and practitioners. The
trend, however, has not yet generally extended to the point of significant
clarity about either the character of the challenge and the scope of the oppor-
tunity, or the intellectual orientation, perspectives, frame of reference, and
operations that may promise most in meeting the challenge and grasping the
opportunity. These ten essays by Wilfred Jenks, written separately over a
period of about seven years and here collected in book form, may be expected
to provide an important, if perhaps tentative and restrained, push in this di-
rection. Their author confesses to being a "harassed international civil ser-
vant" compelled to confine scholarly enterprise to leisure hours.1 Judging
from these essays and from the other monographs he has written, harassment
may be an unsuspected force both for creativity and balance in judgment.
Mr. Jenks is quite explicit about the central theme which, in the several
essays and with varying degrees of directness, he seeks to develop. The cen-
tral theme is that international law is being transformed from a "law govern-
ing the mutual relations of states" to a "common law of mankind."
By the common law of mankind is meant the law of an organized world
community, constituted on the basis of States but discharging its com-
munity functions increasingly through a complex of international and
regional institutions, guaranteeing rights to, and placing obligations upon.
the individual citizen, and confronted with a wide range of economic,
social, and technological problems calling for uniform regulation on an
international basis which represents a. growing proportion of the sub-
ject-matter of the law.2
Mr. Jenks conceives &f this transformation process in .part as a broadening of
the "scope of international law" and in .part -as a development toward the
"universality of international law." He documents the growth aind multipli-
cation of international organizations -as an important factor, causative as well
as catalytic, in this process. The subsidiary but inevitable problem of how op-
timally to accommodate and distribute functions and authority among the
more comprehensive and less comprehensive organizations is briefly consider-
1. P. 120.
2. P. 8.
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ed; and complementarity is presented as the dominant motif to be worked out
in specific allocations and interrelations. To illustrate the range of contempor-
ary problems that reflect basic changes in the conditions of the international
arena and with respect to which the formulation of inclusive standards and
policies has come, in differing degrees, to be regarded as needful, Mr. Jenks
deals in successive essays with colonial policy, employment policy, peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, international cooperation in Antarctica, and peaceful
exploration and use of outer space. The final chapter comprises the now
famous essay that depicts, in classical and urbane lines, the "good craftsman"
in international law who would contribute to, and perhaps significantly in-
fluence, the transfiguration of international law into the "common law of man-
kind."
In his essay on "The Scope of International Law," Mr. Jenks adverts to the
plethora of inclusively prescribed substantive rules that have emerged over
the last half century and affirms the inadequacy of presenting them either as
integral parts of, or as inelegant extrusions from, the inherited framework of
international law. He pleads vigorously for a "re-examination of the existing
concepts of the structure and arrangements of international law" 3 and for ex-
ploring, "empirically and experimentally, ' 4 an approach to a "new synthesis"
of traditional structure and modern substance that will permit "exposition"
of the contemporary law as a "coherent system." He understands the prin-
cipal task along this line to be one of "definition and arrangement" of the
"scope, province and content" of international law.5 Mr. Jenks' recommended
arrangement comprehends nine major categories dealing respectively with the
international law relating to: (1) the structure and law-making processes of
the international community; (2) the peaceful relations of states; (3) human
rights protected by international guarantees; (4) property rights of a distinct-
ly international character; (5) activities of various public services, corpora-
tions, and individuals; (6) conflict of laws; (7) treaties and other interna-
tional agreements; (8) international arbitration and judicial settlement; and
(9) use of force in international relations.
Thus, Mr. Jenks has achieved an impressive listing of matters with respect
to which substantive standards and rules are projected in contemporary inter-
national law. And, in keeping with his theme that a "common law of mankind"
is a "law of an organized world community," he places prominent emphasis
upon the expanding role of international institutions in processes of authority
in the world arena. It is; however, somewhat difficult to discover the compre-
hensive unifying structure, the organizing principles and criteria, that would
appropriately qualify this "preseiitation" as a "colferent system." Mr. Jenks
has too modestly defined the nature of the immediate tasks that must be per-
formed if legal scholars are to contribute to the development both of "an or-






mit all its peoples to approximate the richest fulfillment of their common value
aspirations. It seems open to debate whether the redefinition and rearrange-
ment of varying sets of authoritative propositions constitute the most impor-
tant and most pressing requirements of such development, and whether they
are more than relatively minor aspects even of what Mr. Jenks describes as
"the collective and long-term task of rebuilding the intellectual foundations
of a more adequate analysis and exposition" 6 of a contemporary law of na-
tions.
To rebuild intellectual foundations, a scholar must begin with a clear notion
of what he means by "law." Not that the ancient disputation as to whether in-
ternational law is or is not appropriately characterized as "law" should be
resurrected (though this is not, it might be added, exclusively a matter of
de gustibus non disputandum est; verbal characterizations do have an
impact upon the perspectives of peoples). But the scholar must become very
clear about the reference he assigns to "law" and, whatever else may be en-
compassed in such reference, it must include not merely words (perspectives
authoritatively verbalized) but a whole process of decision (perspectives and
operations) and a way of distinguishing between decisions which are both
authoritative and effective and decisions which are effective only. An operable
conception of decision-making requires the scholar to identify the maker of
decisions, locate him in a social process, distinguish the events that come to the
focus of his attention from the responses that he makes in the form of deci-
sions about such events. Moreover, he must inquire into and intellectually iso-
late the various factors that, in varying degree, account for-that is, condition
or affect-such responses, and consider the probable consequences of such
decisions in terms of relative approximation of, or regression from, the value
goals to which the decision-maker is committed. The requirements of investi-
gation that focuses upon decisions are, at this level of abstraction, the same
both for decisions where authority and effective control converge and for
decisions where authority plays but a negligible role. The former, of course,
has traditionally constituted the distinctive field of study for the lawyer.
To be sure, a variety of intellectual models may facilitate the making of
these distinctions and the performance of these tasks.7 Over the last two
decades or so, one model has been developed and increasingly refined and ap-
plied by academicians who explicitly avow an orientation to the consequences
of legal decision upon policy.8 They constantly seek to perform an intelligence
6. P. 58.
7. See, e.g., SNYDER, BRUCx & SAPIN, DEcISION-MAKING AS AN APPROACH TO THE
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1954); KAPLAN, SYSTEM AND PRocEss IN INTER-
NATIONAL POLITICS (1957); Q. WRIGHT, THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(1955); LUCE & RAIFFA, GAMES AND DEcrsioNs (1957); SHumIK, READINGS IN GAME
THEORY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1954); DAVIDSON, SUPPES & SIEGEL, DECISION MAKING;
AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH (1957); PARs Os, THE SmucruRE OF SOCIAL AcTION
(1937) ; TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF AcTION (Parsons & Shils eds. 1954) ; Easton, An
Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, 9 WoRLD POLITICS 383 (1957).
8. The written presentations include: Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943);
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and recommending function in relating such decisions to the value patterns
of a public order dedicated to human dignity-an "ideal" society that would
actively seek to achieve the widest possible sharing of values among its human
constituents. Some reference to this model for teleologically-oriented inquiry
may provide an interesting comparison with Mr. Jenks' new synthesis.
Under the model, initial discriminations are made by conceptualizing the
raw, living events that crowd the international arena in such bewildering pro-
fusion, in terms of a global process of social interaction for, and interdetermina-
tion of, values. Within this overall community process, the theoreticians distin-
guish a global effective-power process-a process wherein power is conceived
by the participants to be the principal value at stake-from other component
value processes that are primarily engaged in for values other than power. To
facilitate the ascription of operational meaning to these basic conceptualiza-
tions, the world power and other value processes are each analytically broken
down into a few major phases or features including: participants, with their
perspectives; the arenas or situations and conditions in which they interact;
the base (instrumental) values they employ; the strategies they devise and
pursue; and the outcomes or changes in relative value positions that ensue
from interaction.
Within the world process of effective power, as in every other value process,
is found a stream of decisions; each value process may in fact be conceived of
as comprising a decision-making process. Legal scholars characteristically focus
upon decisions with respect to the making and content of which authoritative
community expectations are projected. Accordingly, a specialized process of
authoritative decision-making is next distinguished within, and as an integral
aspect of, the world process of effective power. Systematic description of this
authoritative or legal-decision process is sought by utilizing categories paral-
lel to those employed in describing the power process: decision-makers, with
their objectives; the arenas and conditions in which decisions are made; the
bases of power utilized to sustain the decisions arrived at; the functions per-
formed in the course of making and implementing decisions; and the result-
McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 HAGUtE
RE cUr L 137 (1953) ; Lasswell, Current Studies of the Decision, Process: Automation Ver-
sus Creativity, 8 W. PoL. Q. 381 (1955) ; Dession & Lasswell, Public Order Under Law:
The Role of the Advisor-Draftsman in the Fonation of Code or Constitution, 65 YA.E
L.J. 174 (1955) ; Dession, The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Crini-
nal Law, 5 BUFFALO L. RLv. 22 (1955); Katzenbacb, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse:
Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J.
1087 (1956) ; Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment: Principles of Content and Procedure,
1 INQuIRY 87 (1958) ; McDougal & Lipson, Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52
A . J. INTL L. 407 (1958); McDougal & Burke, Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Cd'm-
nuity Perspectives Versus National Egoism, 67 YAIE L.J. 539 (1958); McDougal &
Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The General Principles of the
Law of War, 67 YALM L.J. 771 (1958); McDougal, The Impact of International Law
Upon Natidnal Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D.L. Rav. 25 (1959) ; Lasswell
& Donnelly, The Continuing Debate Over Responsibility: An Introduction to Isolating
the Cdndernation Sanction, 68 YALE L.J. 869 (1959).
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ing effects upon allocations of values between contending claimants and in the
community at large.
With this basic intellectual frame of reference, the legal scholar can at-
tempt to perform those tasks that are demanded in any inquiry envisaging,
beyond the satisfactions of private comprehension of international life and of
symmetrical arrangements of legal rules and doctrines, the active moulding
of the developing future more nearly in accordance with the configurations
desired. The scholar may proceed to make completely explicit both the value
goals and policies established by the community and those which he, as an
informed and responsible moral being, would recommend; to describe and
examine the flow of decisions for trends conforming to or deviating from the
goals and policies so specified; to identify the contextual factors that account
for the actual contours of decisions and trends in decision; to estimate the
probable future course of decision by the disciplined projection of observed
trends; and, lastly, to consider alternatives in specific policy and procedures
that may promise more by way of swifter movement, at less social cost, toward
the clarified objectives of policy.
Distinctively, the international lawyer inquires into those phases or features
or particular types of interaction in the world power and other value pro-
cesses which are, in and through the functioning of authoritative decisional
processes, accorded community approbation and protection or disapprobation
and rejection. This is, in its most general tenor, an inquiry into the state of
public order in the world arena. In the hands of the lawyer, the preliminary
purport of the model is thus to assist in isolating the recurring contexts of
disagreement over the limits or requirements of authoritative community
policy bearing upon such phases or features or interaction. These controver-
sies-the problems that are of immediate concern to the lawyer--can, on one
level of abstraction, be generalized as sets of contraposed claims and counter-
claims which the authoritative decision-makers must resolve. For sharper
focus in the performance of the tasks necessarily involved in the problem-
solving process that is international law, these controversies may be organized
around the same categorizations used in describing the power and other value
processes in the world arena. Initial emphasis is laid upon the problems aris-
ing in the world process of effective power; this process continues to com-
prehend, directly and immediately, the bulk of international law.
Thus, authoritative community policy is concerned with the type and char-
acter of participants in the world power process. With increased frequency in
recent years, authoritative decision-makers have been confronted by dramatic
changes in the composition of the international community as new territorially-
based bodies politic have emerged. Newly organized territorial communities
commonly demand to be recognized as fully competent to take part in all
authority functions and processes in the international arena. Community
policy, however, acknowledges that already established states frequently grant
or withhold recognition as a tactic in strategic diplomacy. Since the same
events in the world power process that manifest the factual organization of
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a new body politic most commonly mark the modification or reconstruction
of some older polity or polities, decision-makers are simultaneously presented
with specific claims for continued enjoyment of benefits and with specific
claims for responsible assumption of burdens.
New territorial elites make many particular claims for access, in many
differing types of interaction, to varying arenas of formal authority, includ-
ing both municipal tribunals of different states and external forums, or-
ganized and unorganized. Other specific claims characteristic of new elites
relate to almost every other feature of the world power process. These claims
are dealt with in a large number of decisions which formulate and apply
authoritative policy about "consequences of recognition." Demands for ad-
mission to the organized external arenas, constituted by international govern-
mental organizations and international tribunals, also raise certain problems
which decision-makers seek to regulate under labels of varying equivalence:
"membership, .... representation," "credentials," and the like.
Even a quick and cursory examination reveals the number and multifari-
ousness of the claims and demands states make with respect to the bases of
power they employ in their day-to-day interaction and competition for values.
Specific claims of this general type are conveniently grouped under three
broad categories that refer to the fundamental components of state power:
people, resources, and institutions.
With respect to people, most conspicuously a state claims, vis-a.-vis other
states, the comprehensive, continuous control and protection of certain
people as members of its community: "Mr. A is our national." By way of
restricting the competence claimed by states to prescribe criteria and con-
ditions for inclusion of people in this class, community policy establishes cer-
tain requirements of a "genuine connection" between the person claimed and
the claimant state. Control over people is the cumulative import of more
particular demands to competence to determine who may participate, to
what extent, in what internal value processes; these demands for control
may thus be subcategorized for minutely detailed examination in terms of
the internal value processes in which participation is at stake both for in-
dividuals and for the varying private groups those individuals organize.
Some international regulation of these demands is attempted by specifying
and applying, in the case of aliens, a "minimum international standard" of
treatment and principles and procedures for "diplomatic protection" by the
alien's home state. In the case of citizens and stateless persons, the relevant
common standards are those of "human rights" and "asylum."
Claims to varying degrees of control over resources have long been the
subject of community prescription and policy. The claims of states to the
complete and exclusive control over the resources which constitute their geo-
graphical base-including land masses, internal waters, and air space-are
the most characteristic. Claims to establish exclusive control over unappro-
priated land areas were much more important in preceding centuries than
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today, though, as Mr. Jenks documents," they have recurred with respect
to the polar areas. As access to surfaces of comparable solidity in outer space
is obtained, claims of this type may possibly acquire new prominence. An
impressive and increasing amount of community prescription, conventional
and customary, is addressed to the accommodation of competing claims to
the use and exploitation of great common resources such as international
rivers, international waterways, and the oceans. The beginnings of commun-
ity policy about uses of outer space seem now, Mr. Jenks believes,' 0 at
least hazily discernible. Another type of resource that may become particu-
larly important in the future is weather or climate." As techniques of
weather modification are invented and developed, the assertion of claims to
control this resource may be expected. They may pose still more perplexing
problems of policy.
Freedom to determine the specific forms of, and exclusive competence to
control, internal institutional arrangements-the structures and processes
of both authoritative and effective decision-making established within its
borders-is fundamental to a territorial community that presents itself to
the rest of the world as a distinct unit of participation in global value pro-
cesses. The common corollary of these comprehensive claims is the demand
for an equal voice in the prescribing of policies for the general community
of states. Appropriately contraposed to these claims are the demands, made
by the rest of the community, that the new state assume an equal responsi-
bility for applying and sustaining jointly formulated policies, in internal as
in external arenas, and for maintaining municipal institutions substantially
adequate to permit performance of the specific obligations that responsibility
entails.
Claims and controversies about the practices or strategies in which states en-
gage in the course of mutual interaction may be organized under two main
headings that correspond to the two principal modes of interaction: the one
of persuasion or agreement, the other of deprivation or coercion. This group-
ing does not imply rigid dichotomy, but embraces the whole spectrum of mo-
dalities ranging from those in which friendly persuasion is predominant to
those involving the most severe and comprehensive deprivations. The first
principal group includes all controversies that relate to the privileges and
immunities of state officials thrust into the world arena as agents of their
body politic for peaceful interaction. It includes, further, the many differing
controversies that arise at every phase of the making and execution of agree-
ments-formation, application, interpretation, termination-in the disposition
of which decision-makers have recourse to the body of prescriptions compen-
diously designated as the "law of treaties." The second principal group com-
prehends manifold problems arising in connection with infliction of depriva-
tions which may differ widely in degree of severity or intensity. Relatively
9. Pp. 367-69.
10. P. 401.
I. See U.S. ADVISORY CoMi. ON WEATHER CONTROL, FINAL REPORT (1958).
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mild deprivations generate controversies about attribution of responsibility
and determination of appropriate reciprocities to which decision-makers re-
spond by invoking somewhat amorphous doctrines like "state responsibility,"
"nonintervention," "international delinquencies," or "international torts."
The infliction of more severe deprivation or the exercise of more intense
coercion evokes varying claims and countering claims with regard to every
aspect or stage of such coercion or deprivation-from resort or initiation,
through management and conduct, to deceleration and termination. For se-
curing community control and mitigation of these claims, there have emerged
over the centuries certain fundamental policies embodied in what is similarly
compendiously called the "law of war."
The remaining major category covers a multitude of specific claims and
controversies that relate to the outcomes and effects of interaction in world
power processes. Preliminarily, controversies with respect to the outcomes
that are obtained in particular instances of interaction are to be distinguished
from controversies relating to the aggregate effects of the whole process of
power upon the structure and composition of the international community in
general and upon the internal structure and composition of individual parti-
cipating polities. The one is concerned with competing demands for authori-
ty over-in the sense of competence to prescribe and apply policy to--a set
of events or changes in value positions comprising a particular transaction,
encounter or activity, either of state officials or of private persons and asso-
ciations. The other deals with demands asserted in the course of the restruct-
uring or reconstituting of the international community that results from the
alteration or extinction of old bodies politic and the emergence of new ones.
Controversies embraced in the first group commonly present the issue of
whose policy is to be applied to the events which may variously have oc-
curred within the territory of the forum state, or upon the high seas and
superincumbent air space, or within another state's territory. In the resolu-
tion of this general issue, decision-makers have customarily referred to com-
plementary prescriptions about "bases of jurisdiction" and about "acts of state"
and "immunities," as well as to the body of doctrine commonly called "pri-
vate international law" or "conflict of laws." The second group includes all
the demands and counterdemands-of both the old and the new bodies poli-
tic and of third states-for reconsidering or continuing a variety of com-
mitments made prior to the structural changes in the several polities in-
volved. These controversies have traditionally been met with doctrines per-
vaded by a rather elusive distinction between "state succession" and "suc-
cession of governments." Thus, consideration of these controversies about out-
comes and effects shades almost imperceptibly into consideration of the prob-
lems subsumed under the initial category of participants. The model reflects
both the continuity of power processes and the almost continuous reconstitut-
ing of the world community.
States, while perhaps the most conspicuous type of participant, are by no
means the only kind of groups or entities that effectively participate in the
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world process of effective power. One of the chief merits of Mr. Jenks' pres-
entation is that he accords explicit, if still partial, recognition to this fact.
The model referred to may be utilized for similar contextual inquiry into
the interactions of other types of participants: international governmental
organizations, political parties, pressure groups, private associations, and in-
dividuals. The same model, furthermore, may be employed for analogous in-
quiry into the other global value processes, the processes, that is, in which
the principal value sought is one other than power. Such inquiry, for instance,
into the phases of processes of wealth production and distribution in the inter-
national community which are sought to be subjected to regulation by au-
thoritative decision, would embrace all of what Mr. Jenks calls "the law of
international economic relationships.' 2
The same kind of analysis may, still further, be utilized whatever the ter-
ritorial compass of the processes of social interaction which are examined.
The model, in its application to lawyers' tasks, is designed to provide a frame-
work for analysis and appraisal of any system of public order, whether the
system examined be limited in its geographic comprehension to one province
of a state or to a single state, or comprehend two or a few or many states, and
of the interrelations of such systems. The world is visualized as a graduated
series of community contexts-each exhibiting a public order system--of vary-
ing territorial scope, which intersect and affect each other at many different
points. Reflecting this conception of the world, such a framework may permit
-for the better prosecution of the component tasks of policy-oriented inquiry
-- one to trace the interrelation of each process with every other process and to
place in comprehensive, unifying context not only the problems of "public
international law" and "private international law" but also those of municipal
or regional law. Some such framework seems essential for a comparative in-
vestigation of the various public order systems, in particular for inquiry into
the "general principles of law," sometimes quaintly termed the "general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations." These general principles, when
appropriately explored and formulated, may be regarded as expressing the
deepest-held convictions, demands and supporting expectations of the differ-
ing peoples about the globe, and hence as offering one index to those wider
community perspectives called international law.
This brings us to Mr. Jenks' essay on "The Universality of International
Law." A substantial portion of this essay is devoted to an exploration, im-
pressive in its geographic and temporal scope (from the precepts of Lao-Tze
to the Italian civil law, from Ashanti tribal custom to the law of the Soviet
state), of differing legal systems with the end of ascertaining the extent to
which certain principles, posited as "basic," have been embodied in these sys-
tems. The survey, characterized, Mr. Jenks cautions,13 more by breadth than
by depth, is principally moved by the hope that from varying legal systems
12. P. 152. Dr. Schwarzenberger's phrase is "international economic law." SCHWAR-
ZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (3d ed. 1957).
13. P. 121.
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may be drawn the elements of "a legal system with sufficiently broad and
deep foundations to command the allegiance of a world community with a
fundamentally changed composition and distribution of influence."' 4
Mr. Jenks here gives expression to the long and widely asserted demand
of legal scholars for a universal system of international law. This demand
commonly has at least two aspects: an assertion that all territorially organized
communities, whatever their own internal value-institutional systems, are sub-
ject to the same body of authoritative prescriptions in respect of their ex-
ternal relationships; and a demand for uniformity in the application of these
prescriptions. The first aspect of universality is stressed in Mr. Jenks' affir-
mation of the establishment of a "formal universal order" and of the "con-
solidation of the formal authority of (international) law on a universal ba-
sis."' 5 He refers, of course, to the United Nations, which embraces in its
membership practically every state in the world, and to the fact that every
member state is automatically a "party" to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice and, in particular, to the Statute's formulation of the
"sources of international law." The second aspect of universality, and a cir-
cumstance of some notoriety, namely, diversities in the interpretation and ap-
plication of the same body of authoritative language, are delicately passed
over in a paragraph on "The Underlying Strains of the Transition to a Uni-
versal Order."'u
Mr. Jenks touches the heart of the matter in describing the task of all
scholars of good faith as that of securing "on a world wide basis the essential
elements of a legal order which gives reasonable expression to our sense of
right and justice."'1 7 If, however, any lesson is to be drawn from observing
the facts of contemporary international life, it is that different decision-
makers, though purporting to subscribe to the same legal principles, are in
fact moved by different senses of "right and justice," project differing con-
ceptions of an appropriate world order, and seek to realize very different
fundamental policies about allocation of power and other values. The world
arena exhibits not just one but several demanded systems of international
order, each with its own distinctive pattern of value-shaping and value-shar-
ing, and each aspiring, though with varying expectations of success, to com-
pletion. This is a condition which scholars cannot dissolve by decently ignoring
it or by reiterating demands for universality. To exorcise this condition may
be a task beyond the peculiar skills of lawyers alone, but, frankly recognizing
it, they can examine its impact upon decisions made in world value processes.
Beyond beginning sophistication about competing conceptions of public
order for the world, legal scholars who are convinced that the kind of basic
policies expressed in the law which achieves effective universality does pro-
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of fundamental policies, to the articulation of shared interests, and to the in-
vestigation of the conditions for securing such policies and interests. The task,
in its preliminary aspects, is one of stock-taking, of ascertaining and assessing
with as much explicitness and specificity as possible, by utilizing all the in-
sights and operational techniques offered by the contemporary social sciences,
the policies actually sought and effectively applied by different decision-makers
in their external interactions. From such stock-taking might emerge a map,
as it were, of the configurations of public order that in fact presently obtain
on a transnational scale. In its fullness, the task involved has been aptly des-
cribed:
(1) to develop a jurisprudence, a comprehensive theory and appropriate
methods of inquiry, which will assist the peoples of the world to distin-
guish public orders based on human dignity and public orders based
either on a law which denies human dignity or a denial of law itself for
the simple supremacy of naked force; and (2) to invent and recommend
the authority structures and functions (principles and procedures) neces-
sary to a world public order that harmonizes with the growing aspira-
tions of the overwhelming numbers of the peoples of the globe and is in
accord with the proclaimed values of human dignity enunciated by the
moral leaders of mankind.'
This is the more precise statement of the challenging opportunity thrust upon
scholars of international law. It is hoped that with or without further harass-
ment, Mr. Jenks may turn his very considerable powers to the fuller exploita-
tion of this opportunity.
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANOt
MASTERS OF DECEIT. By J. Edgar Hoover. New York: Henry Holt & Co.,
1958. Pp. 374. $5.00.
"XVoRKs such as the collage, African primitivist statuary, the canvasses of
Jackson Pollack, and the finger painting of talented monkeys have revived
debate recently over the classic problem of asthetics-what is Art? Philoso-
pliers have noted that there are at least three analytical perspectives from
which one can approach this question-the intention of the artist, the intrinsic
merits of the work, and the subjective reaction of the viewer-and that one's
judgment about a controversial work usually will depend upon one's vantage
point. Although this seems a singularly inapposite opening for a review of J.
Edgar Hoover's best-selling volume on communism, I find these exceedingly
helpful terms in which to consider Masters of Deceit.
Hoover deals with five topics. He describes the personalities and doctrines
of international communism from the days of Marx and Engels to the present,
18. McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 28 (1959).
'I-Research Associate and Lecturer, Yale Law School.
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